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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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This paper examines newly available data from the 
World Bank-sponsored Global Antidumping Database 
tracking the worldwide use of trade remedies such as 
antidumping, countervailing duties, global safeguards 
and China-specific safeguards during the current 
economic crisis. The data indicate a marked increase in 
WTO members’ combined resort to these instruments 
beginning in 2008 that continued into the first quarter 
2009. The use of these import-restricting instruments 
is increasingly affecting “South-South” trade, i.e., 
developing country importers initiating and imposing 
new protectionist measures primarily affecting developing 
country exporters, with a special emphasis on exports 
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from China. However, the collective value of imports 
in 2007 for the major (G-20) economies that has 
subsequently come under attack by the use of import-
restricting trade remedies during the period of 2008 to 
early 2009 is likely less than $29 billion, or less than 
0.45 per cent of these economies’ total imports, though 
there is substantial variation across countries. While the 
level of trade affected thus far may be small for most of 
these economies, a first assessment of some of the case-
level data identifies a number of ways in which the crisis 
use of these import-restricting trade remedies may have 
economically important welfare-distorting effects on 
economic activity. 
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1  Introduction  
WTO member countries turn to import-restricting “trade remedy” instruments during both good and 
bad macroeconomic times. Nevertheless, the historical economic evidence finds a strong link between 
economic downturns associated with recessions and exchange rate shocks and an increase in use of 
policies such as antidumping and safeguards. The sudden onset and global nature of the current 
economic crisis has created concern that countries may dramatically increase their use of such trade 
remedy instruments beyond the “normal” underlying current of protectionism associated with the 
ongoing process of adjustment associated with the forces of globalization.  
Section 2 of this paper examines newly available data tracking the global use of these trade 
remedy instruments which does indicate a marked increase in WTO members’ combined resort to these 
instruments beginning in 2008 that continued into the first quarter 2009 during the spread of the global 
economic crisis. The product-level use of trade remedies was 34.0 percent higher in 2008 relative to 
2007, and the first quarter 2009 use was 22.3 per cent higher than the same period in 2008. The 
imposition of new definitive measures in 2009 is projected to be 18.5 per cent higher than the amount 
imposed in 2008.  
A number of countries have resorted to these instruments, including almost all of the Group of 
Twenty (G-20) that are members of the WTO. These countries have few alternatives for invoking new 
forms of potentially WTO-consistent import protection as many are constrained both by the rules of the 
international system and because their pre-crisis applied tariff rates may have been somewhat close to 
their tariff bindings legally submitted to the WTO. The use of these import-restricting instruments is 
increasingly affecting “South-South” trade, i.e., developing country importers initiating and imposing 
new protectionist measures primarily affecting developing country exporters. The majority of the 
product-level actions to limit import competition intensively target exports from China.  
Despite the increasing use of these instruments the amount of imports targeted by these 
measures thus far is relatively small. Collectively, the value of imports in 2007 for these major G-20 
economies that has subsequently come under attack by the use of import-restricting trade remedies 
during the period of 2008 to early 2009 is likely less than $29 billion, or less than 0.45 per cent of these 
economies’ total imports. With the exception of the concern raised by India’s use (1.8 percent of its 
total 2007 imports) in particular, country-by-country estimates indicate that the new protectionism thus 
far covers only 0.2 to 0.8 per cent of these economies’ total pre-crisis (2007) level of imports.  
While the level of trade affected thus far may be small for most of these economies, in section 
3 we make a first assessment of some of the case-level data and identify many possible ways in which 
the crisis use of these import-restricting trade remedies may have economically important welfare-3 
 
distorting effects. These potential losses go beyond the first order concern of the size of lost imports 
associated with targeted products and the losses to domestic consumers and using industries that suffer 
due to reduced access to imported varieties and higher prices. An established body of economic 
research identifies a number of unintended and adverse consequences associated with national resort to 
these trade remedies. We use this literature to guide our more detailed investigation of individual cases. 
We provide examples from crisis period cases in which firms may be using such remedies to generate 
anti-competitive effects imposing an additional burden on consumers. This may especially be the case 
in concentrated sectors such as chemicals and in steel in which recent M&A activity and legacy of 
foreign direct investment creates an environment in which multinational firms and their subsidiaries 
have access to trade remedies in multiple jurisdictions and the possibility of abusing them to segment 
markets.  
The data on the crisis use of trade remedies also suggest that current protectionism, while 
limited, could quickly lead to escalating protectionism through at least three possible channels. The 
first of these is simple tit-for-tat retaliation. The second occurs after one country imposes a trade 
remedy on a product, and a second, third, fourth (etc.) country follow up by using their own import 
restrictions to target the same products due to the fear of a “trade deflection” surge of exports of the 
product into its own market. Finally, a newly imposed upstream trade barrier on imported inputs raises 
the cost to downstream users, creating competitiveness concerns that can generate additional 
downstream industry demands for cascading protectionism. The possibility that the major G-20 
economies are currently invoking policies that may increase the probability of a spiraling, 1930s-style 
resort to Great Depression protectionism is therefore still a primary concern during the global crisis. 
 
2  Monitoring the Combined Use of Trade Remedies 
Economic evidence from historical data (e.g., Knetter and Prusa, 2003; Irwin, 2005) finds a strong link 
between an increase in use of trade remedies during economic downturns associated with recessions 
and exchange rate shocks  The effort to track, assess, and examine the impact of the spread of 
protectionism during the current global economic crisis is complicated. First, the use of “traditional” 
trade remedy instruments of antidumping (AD) and global safeguards (SG) has spread to new 
countries.
2 Second, many countries are also adopting and implementing use of other “new” trade 
remedy instruments such as China-specific transitional safeguards (CSG) and countervailing duties 
(CVD) under “anti-subsidy” laws.
 3 Of the four policy instruments that we include in our analysis, the 
                                                           
2 For surveys see Blonigen and Prusa (2003) for antidumping, and Bown and Crowley (2005) for safeguards.  
 
3 India’s activity in 1Q 2009 provides an illustrative example: India initiated 3 AD investigations, 3 CSG 
investigations, 2 SG investigations, and its first ever CVD investigation, also one in which it targeted China. 4 
 
CSG is the least well known because of its relatively recent arrival on the scene – it is an instrument to 
which WTO members negotiated access beginning in 2001 as part of China’s agreement to accede to 
the WTO, and it remains in place as a potential import-restricting policy instrument through 2014. The 
other lesser known and historically lesser-utilized instrument is the CVD policy. There may be some 
cause for speculation of a global shift toward increased use of this particular anti-subsidy instrument 
associated both with increased pressure relating to exports from China, as well as the current spread of 
the use of subsidies in government stimulus packages in light of the global economic crisis.
4  
Therefore, while we are interested in tracking the combined use of these relatively substitutable 
forms of import protection especially in light of the global economic crisis, doing so requires more than 
simply additively aggregating their use. Some of these trade remedy instruments apply to specific 
foreign countries while others are applied on a more nondiscriminatory, most-favored-nation (MFN) 
basis across foreign sources.
5 In the presence of multiple trade remedy instruments which can be 
“substitutes” providing the same access to import protection, one way to normalize the data to assess 
the frequency of their combined use over time is to examine non-redundant requests for new protection 
undertaken within a policy-implementing economy at the product level.
 6  For example, such an 
approach does make a country’s use of AD or CVD targeting multiple foreign sources of the same 
imported product more comparable to global safeguard (SG) protection. This is the approach we adopt 
in sections 2.1 through 2.5, before then examining in section 2.6 the collective size of the imports likely 
to be affected by the use of these trade remedy instruments. 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
4 The first reason is the increasingly prominent role of China’s exports in the world trading system and the fact 
that, unrelated to the financial crisis, the U.S. changed a 23 year old policy in March 2007 when the Department 
of Commerce indicated it would now “consider” industry petitions for import protection under the nation’s 
countervailing duty initiations against China. As one of the pivotal players in the rules-based WTO system, the 
signal that the U.S. sent by initiating CVD use against China may spur other WTO member countries to adopt a 
similar approach. The second reason is due to the massive subsidies that major economies are currently imposing 
as part of their stimulus packages to deal with the global economic crisis. Some trading partners may seek to use 
CVDs to address what they perceive as trade-distorting effects of such subsidies.  
 
5 In principle these trade remedy instruments do require different forms of evidence before they can be applied. 
AD requires evidence of less-than fair value pricing (dumping) and injury to the domestic industry from the 
dumped imports; CVD requires evidence of foreign subsidization and injury, SG requires evidence of injury 
caused by increasing imports, and CSG requires evidence of injury caused by increasing imports from China. 
Nevertheless, economic research such as Bown (2004) and Bown and McCulloch (2003) has shown that these 
instruments can be applied in ways that have similar effects on trade flows. 
 
6 For example, by an initiation or measure being defined at the product level, we mean that the U.S.’s two 2Q 
2008 antidumping investigation of “Certain circular welded carbon quality steel line pipe” from Korea and from 
China are treated as one product-level investigation. Furthermore, to ensure product-level initiations are not 
redundant across policy instruments, a WTO member’s simultaneous AD and CVD cases over the same product 
are treated as one case. For example, the U.S.’s 2Q 2008 simultaneous AD and CVD investigations of “Certain 
circular welded carbon quality steel line pipe” from China are also treated as one product-level investigation.  
 5 
 
In the next section we begin our discussion of the combined use of these trade remedies. For 
readers interested in tracking the trends in the underlying data on a policy-by-policy basis, appendix 
figures A through D present information on the initiations and measures imposed of each of the four 
distinctive trade remedy instruments over time. 
 
2.1  The increase in trade remedy use during the crisis 
As Figure 1a indicates, WTO members initiated 35 new product-level  investigations requesting 
imposition of new import restrictions under national trade remedy laws during the first quarter (1Q) of 
2009, our most recently available data.
7 This is an increase of 22.3 per cent compared to the same 
period in 2008 and also continues an upward trend. The total number of new, product-level import-
restricting investigations launched in 2008 was 34.0 per cent higher than the number of new 
investigations initiated during 2007.
 It is worth pointing out, however, that the 2007 year was a relative 
low point for new trade remedy initiations under instruments such as AD, SG, and CSG (see again 
appendix figures A through D).   
The historical data on the use of these trade policies, especially in the case of the dominant AD 
instrument in use in many countries around the world, indicates that the vast majority of new 
investigations and requests for import protection ultimately result in the imposition of new “definitive” 
import restrictions in the form of tariffs, price undertakings, or quantitative restrictions. While the share 
of new investigations resulting in the imposition of final measures in developed economies like the 
U.S. and EC may have recently fallen to the range of 50-60 per cent, the share is much higher in many 
developing countries. This includes some of the countries that are the major new sources of the current 
rise in initiated investigations (e.g., India, Turkey), where it is not uncommon to find 80-95 per cent of 
the initiations resulting in the imposition of new measures. Overall, 79 per cent of the investigations 
initiated in 2007 that reached the stage a final determination by 1Q 2009 resulted in the imposition of a 
definitive import restriction. 
Figure 1b tracks the imposition of new measures at the product level across the same sample of 
WTO members illustrated in figure 1a. WTO members imposed 20 new product-level definitive import 
restrictions in 1Q 2009 under national trade remedy laws, an increase of 5.1 per cent compared to 1Q 
                                                           
7 Most of this activity is antidumping, however, the use of other instruments has been increasing recently. As 
described in the Global Antidumping Database, these figures are based on original source, nationally provided 
data for AD and CVD. The data reported in the text and figures is based on that collected for 20 AD- (18 CVD-) 
using countries, and while this does not comprehensively cover the global use of the instrument, historically these 
countries represented 90 per cent of AD (93 per cent of CVD) initiations by all WTO members during 1995-2007. 
The data collected on countries’ use of SG and CSG is comprehensive and obtained from the WTO in addition to 
national government sources. 6 
 
2008, and the annualized rate translates to the frequency of new import restrictions in 2009 to be 11.9 
per cent higher than the rate at which definitive new measures were imposed in 2008.  
Figure 1.  Combined Use of  Import-Restricting Trade Remedies, 1Q 2007 - 1Q 2009  
 



































b. Newly Imposed Import-Restricting Trade Remedies at the Product Level , Including Projected 










































Source:  Compiled by the author from the Global Antidumping Database. These are non-redundant AD, CVD, 
SG, CSG at the product level The figure 1b projections for 2Q 2009 through 1Q 2010 are based on the 2007 year 
rate of 79 per cent of initiations subsequently resulting in definitive measures, the 2007 average of a 4 quarter lag 
between initiation and imposition of final measure, and the rate of initiations between 2Q 2008 and 1Q 2009 




However, this annualized figure will certainly under-predict the actual increase in imposed 
measures in 2Q through 4Q of 2009. The increase in the rate of imposed measures is expected to be 
larger than 11.9 per cent higher than the number imposed in 2008, given the sharp increase in newly 
initiated investigations in 2Q through 4Q of 2008 (see again figure 1a). To highlight this point, in figure 
1b we illustrate the projected imposition of definitive new import restrictions at the product-level for 
these countries between 2Q 2009 and 1Q 2010. These projections are computed from assumptions and 
parameters estimates from the 2007 data: 79 per cent of new initiations result in definitive measures, it 
takes four quarters to reach imposition of a measure after initiation of an investigation, and the number 
of new investigations initiated each quarter between 2Q 2008 and 1Q 2009 are as in figure 1a. While 
this approach is admittedly crude and does not control for the likelihood that the share of investigations 
that may result in definitive measures may rise during the crisis, as a conservative benchmark it 
suggests at least an 18.5 per cent increase in imposed measures in 2009 when compared to 2008.  
 
2.2  The countries that are using the trade remedies to limit imports 
In addition to documenting the time trend of trade remedy use, figures 1a and 1b also illustrate the 
relative frequency with which these actions are being taken by developed versus developing economy 
users of import protectionist instruments. The figures indicate that increasingly these actions are being 
undertaken by developing countries. 
Table 1 provides further information on the country-level use of these trade policy instruments 
between 1Q 2007 and 1Q 2009. Most striking is that since the onset of the crisis – or roughly between 
1Q 2008 and 1Q 2009, developing countries initiated 74 per cent of all new investigations. This use has 
been dominated by India (20 per cent), Argentina (12 per cent), Turkey (8 per cent), Brazil (7 per cent), 
and China (5 per cent). Developed economies initiated only 26 per cent of the new investigations 
during this time, although most of those derive from initiations by the United States (8 per cent) and the 
European Union (7 per cent).  8 
 
Table 1. Country Use of Non-redundant AD, CVD, SG, CSG at the Product Level, 1Q 2007 - 1Q 2009 
















         
U.S.  14  12 1    3 13 3 
EC  6 10 1    8  9  1 
Canada  1 3 1    1 3 1 
Australia  3 4 1    2 0 3 
New Zealand  2 0 0    1 1 0 
South Korea  6 3 0    0 6 2 
Taiwan  0 0 0    1 0 0 
Israel  0 1 3    1 0 0 
         
Argentina  6 11 8    6  4  2 
Brazil  8 10 0    11 5  1 
India  14 21  9    11 11  4 
Turkey  6 12 1    4 10 2 
China  1 6 2    6 1 0 
South Africa  5 2 1    2 2 0 
Pakistan  0 3 1    2 0 0 
Colombia  1 6 1    7 0 1 
Mexico  3 1 1    0 0 0 
Peru  2 0 1    1 0 0 
Venezuela  0 0 0    0 0 0 
Ukraine  5 4 2    0 5 0 
         
Others  1 9 1    2 1 0 
                       
Developed countries total  32 33  7    17 32 10 
Developing countries total  52 85 28      52 39 10 
Total  84  118  35    69 71 20 
 
Source:  Compiled by the author from the Global Antidumping Database. These are non-redundant AD, CVD, 
SG, CSG at the product level. 
 
 
2.3  The targeted sectors 
Table 2 illustrates the product-level requests by sector for new import restrictions under these trade 
remedy instruments between 1Q 2007 and 1Q 2009. For the developed economy users, the industries 
most frequently resorting to these instruments are chemicals, iron and steel, and machinery, with 65 per 
cent of the developed economy initiations since 1Q 2008 occurring in just one of these three sectors. As 
these are the historically dominant sectoral users of trade remedies, the predominance of their use 
during the crisis is not surprising. Nevertheless, the recurrence of use in these sectors, and the 9 
 
possibility of abuse on anti-competitive grounds is a potential cause for concern and additional inquiry 
and is an issue to which we will return in more detail in section 3 below.  
 
Table 2. Developed and Developing Economy Trade Remedy Initiations by Sector, 1Q 2007 - 1Q 2009 
 
















         
Agriculture  2 1 0    0 1 2 
Chemicals  10 8  0    17  18 8 
Iron and steel  8 11 1    5 12 2 
Machinery  1 5 1    8 7 3 
Materials  1 0 2    4 9 1 
Misc. manufactures  0 1 1    2 5 0 
Other metals  0 3 0    2 5 3 
Plastics and rubber  4 0 0    5  10  1 
Textiles  1 1 0    6  14  6 
Vehicles  0 1 0    1 2 1 
Wood  5 2 2    2 2 1 
          
Total  32 33  7    52 85 28 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the Global Antidumping Database. These are non-redundant AD, CVD, SG, 
and CSG at the product level. Developed countries are U.S., EC, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Israel. Developing countries are Argentina, Brazil, India, Turkey, China, South Africa, Pakistan, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Ukraine. 
 
Developing country firms have also initiated a number of new requests for import protection under 
trade remedy instruments since 1Q 2008 in the steel, chemicals, and machinery sectors (44 per cent of 
total developing country initiations). The other two sectors with a high number of new investigations in 
developing countries are textiles and apparel and plastics and rubber, which combine for another 27 per 
cent of the total developing economy activity under these instruments during the crisis. 
 
2.4  The targeted exporters 
Table 3 illustrates the frequency with which exporters in various countries have been targeted by 
country-specific trade remedy instruments such as AD, CVD and CSG. Given the economies that are 
using these trade policies and the sectors that are being targeted for new import restrictions, it is not 
surprising that the exporters targeted by these actions are primarily located in other developing 
countries. The frequency with which developing countries as a whole have been targeted in country-10 
 
specific trade remedy investigations is 72 per cent during the crisis period of 2008 through 1Q 2009, 
which is a slight increase from 68 per cent in 2007. 
 
Table 3. Exporters Targeted by Product-Level use of AD, CVD and CSG, 1Q 2007 - 1Q 2009 
 
   Initiations     Measures 















          
Total  156 217  46    104 119  36 
                       
         
Developing country exporters  106  159  30    71 81 29 
(percent of total)  (0.68) (0.73) (0.65)    (0.68) (0.68) (0.81) 
Developed country exporters  50 58 16    33 38  7 
         
         
China   63 86 19    46 49 16 
(percent of total)  (0.40) (0.40) (0.41)    (0.44) (0.41) (0.44) 
         
South Korea   12  9 2    5 7 2 
European Union  8 15 6    4  8  1 
Thailand   7 12 2    5  1  3 
U.S.  8 10 2    4  6  1 
Taiwan   6 9 0    7 7 2 
Malaysia   5 10 0    4  2  3 
Indonesia   5 11 2    3  4  2 
India   5 9 0    4 3 2 
Japan   4 3 0    5 2 0 
Russia   6 2 0    0 5 0 
UAE  3 0 0    0 1 1 
Brazil   2 3 4    2 2 0 
Turkey   3 3 0    0 3 0 
         
Others  19 35  9    15 19  3 
                       
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the Global Antidumping Database. 
 
2.5  China as the export target 
The use of country-specific trade remedy instruments such as AD, CVD and CSG documented in table 
3 also illustrates the intensity with which these using countries are targeting exports from China. Of the 
country-specific trade remedy initiations and measures imposed, China alone constituted roughly 40 11 
 
per cent of the total of countries named in the investigations during this period and slightly more than 
40 per cent of the definitive measures that have been imposed.  
A different method of measuring the intensity of use of these trade remedies against China’s 
exports is to examine this from the product-level perspective. For example, in 1Q 2009, the other WTO 
members (from whom this data is derived) named China in 19 of the 27 (70 per cent of) newly initiated 
product-level investigations under (AD, CVD, CSG) laws that require the investigating country to 
specifically name at least one exporting country.
8 In 12 out of these 27 (44 per cent of) investigations, 
China was the only country named. Finally, in the remaining 7 instances in which China was named as 
one of multiple exporting countries, there was only one other exporting country named in the product-
level investigation. The evidence suggests that a focus of many of these trade policy initiations are to 
restrict imports from China. 
The WTO membership’s use of trade remedy instruments to target China’s exports is not new – 
it continues a trend dating back to China’s WTO accession in 2001 and even earlier (Bown, 
forthcoming a). Explanations for the increasing intensity of use of these instruments against China’s 
exports since 2001 include: China’s export increase during this period, as more exports means more 
potential foreign targets for use of antidumping and other trade remedies; China’s receipt of MFN 
treatment in WTO members’ tariff schedules since 2001, which constrains to trade remedy instruments 
WTO members’ ability to impose potentially WTO-consistent (but discriminatory) import protection 
against China; China continues to be treated as a “non-market economy” (NME) in many countries’ 
antidumping procedures which gives AD authorities more discretion than is available vis-à-vis other 
exporters to calculate dumping margins; and many WTO members do not feel as though China’s state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and its government’s use of other explicit and implicit subsidies have been 
sufficiently curtailed since its 2001 accession.
  
One important question is whether the global crisis increases the intensity of use of these 
instruments against China’s exporters relative to exporters in other WTO member countries. Will the 
phenomenon of using trade remedies to target China create additional political pressure within China 
either to increase its own use of trade remedies (perhaps as a response partially-motivated by 
retaliation), or to take a more active role in the WTO to attempt to slow down the use of these 
instruments (perhaps through formal dispute settlement, where it has been thus far slow to engage).
9  
Finally, figure 2 illustrates the relative frequency with which trade remedy-using countries are 
targeting China’s various export sectors with newly initiated investigations. There are a number of 
                                                           
8 Of the 35 product-level newly initiated investigations in the 1Q 2009, six did not name any exporting countries 
because they were global safeguards, and China initiated two investigations itself. 
 
9 For a discussion of recent dispute activity at the WTO between the U.S. and China, see Bown (2009b). 12 
 
Chinese exporting industries facing newly initiated investigations during this period – including 
chemicals, iron and steel, machinery, and textiles. We return to a more detailed discussion of the same 
Chinese export products being targeted in different foreign markets in our more detailed discussion of 
some of the underlying cases in section 3 below. 
 
Figure 2.  Newly Initiated Import-Restricting Trade Remedy Investigations Targeting China’s Exports, 1Q 2007 - 

















Source:  Compiled by the author from the Global Antidumping Database. These are non-redundant AD, CVD, 




2.6  The size of the imports under attack from the use of such trade remedies 
Here we provide a first attempt to assess the size of the potential economic problem these potential 
trade remedies pose. I.e., how much trade is coming under attack from the increasing resort to trade 
remedies?  
Table 4 provides a first pass at this question by documenting a number of pieces of data on the 
size and relative importance of the 2007 (i.e., pre-crisis) level of trade at the level of 6-digit 
Harmonized System (HS) imports associated with the products and exporting countries that are the 
targets of most of the G-20’s newly initiated investigations since the beginning of 2008 and continuing 
through 1Q 2009.
10 The table reports four columns of data: the 2007 value of imports subsequently 
                                                           



































being targeted (i.e., “targeted imports”) by each economy’s new and subsequent investigations since 
1Q 2008; the targeted imports as a share of the country’s total 2007 imports; the targeted imports 
deriving from China as a share of the total targeted imports, and the targeted imports deriving from 
China as a share of the country’s total imports from China. We construct this table for 12 of the largest 
WTO economies and users of these trade remedy instruments – four developed and eight developing 
countries. 
 




Value of 2007 










from China as a 
share of all 
investigated imports 
Investigated imports 
from China as a 
share of all imports 
from China 
       
Total  $28,977,070,131 0.0045  0.5889 0.0164 
       
Developed Economies      
EC  $8,032,246,785 0.0041  0.3983 0.0101 
U.S.  $7,458,154,471 0.0037  0.9032 0.0198 
Canada  $852,235,098 0.0022  0.9160 0.0218 
Australia  $95,253,092 0.0006  0.7643 0.0030 
       
Developing Economies      
China  $6,183,277,841 0.0064  na na 
India  $3,943,953,974 0.0180  0.4749 0.0762 
Turkey  $1,383,230,509 0.0081  0.1452 0.0152 
Brazil  $540,548,035 0.0044  0.5787 0.0248 
Argentina  $315,794,401 0.0070  0.5221 0.0324 
Pakistan  $108,991,018 0.0033  0.5405 0.0141 
Mexico  $55,581,511 0.0002  0.3106 0.0006 
South Africa  $7,803,396 0.0001  0.7216 0.0007 
       
Sources: Product level (6-digit HS codes) for AD, CVD, CSG and SG investigations for these countries obtained 
from the Global Antidumping Database and matched to  6-digit HS Comtrade 2007 import data available via 
WITS. Intra-EC trade is excluded. 
 
Not surprisingly, table 4 first reveals that the two economies with the largest levels of imports 
potentially affected by the remedies are the EC ($8.0 billion) and the U.S. ($7.5 billion). However, the 
relative importance of the targeted imports is fairly small, as only 0.4 per cent of 2007 imports in these 14 
 
economies are in 6-digit HS product categories that have become subject to new investigations initiated 
since 1Q 2008. Table 4 also indicates that developed countries such as Canada and Australia not only 
have a much smaller level of trade potentially affected, but the targeted imports measured as a share of 
their total imports is much smaller than the U.S. and EC as well. 
The data for some of the developing economy users of these trade remedies is a bit more 
worrisome. India, the most frequent user of these trade remedies (table 1), is estimated to have $3.9 
billion in 2007 imports that have been subject to new trade remedy investigations during the crisis thus 
far – 1.8 per cent of its total 2007 imports. China (0.64 per cent), Argentina (0.7 per cent) and Turkey 
(0.8 per cent) are other examples of countries whose share of their total 2007 imports being subject to 
new import restrictions during the crisis is greater share than that of the U.S. and EC. China is an 
interesting case because while its underlying frequency of cases has been limited during the crisis (only 
8 new product-level initiations since 1Q 2008), the investigations collectively covered a relatively 
sizable level of 2007 imports ($6.2 billion). 
Before moving to relative comparisons of the data, it is worth noting that there are at least three 
reasons to speculate that the table 4 estimates on the size of value of imports affected by crisis use of 
trade remedies thus far are likely to provide an upper bound on the total size of imports affected by 
these trade remedy initiations: 1) the trade data is matched to the trade remedy data at the 6-digit HS 
level, and in practice many countries impose trade remedies at the 8- or 10- digit HS level, thus not 
affecting all sub-products within a given 6-digit category; 2) not all of these newly initiated 
investigations will result in imposed measures;
11 and 3) imports in 2008 and 2009 may fall from their 
pre-crisis (2007) levels for reasons unrelated to trade remedies but instead because of other (demand 
side income effects or supply side credit constraints) shocks associated with the crisis.
12 
Next, table 4 also reveals how the potential economic impact of the trade remedy use during 
the crisis period may affect China’s exports differentially depending on the using country. Of the 
combined imports targeted by these eleven other economies use of trade remedies since the crisis, 58.9 
per cent of those targeted imports derived from China’s exporters alone. On a country-by-country basis, 
this ranged from more than 90 per cent of the imports subject to investigations in the U.S. and Canada, 
to only 31 per cent in Mexico and less than 15 per cent of the imports targeted by Turkey’s use of new 
trade remedies. 
                                                           
11 Nevertheless, research such as Staiger and Wolak (1994) has shown that the mere harassment of initiations can 
have an adverse effect on trade flows, even in cases in which definitive trade restrictions are not imposed. 
 
12 Furthermore, the likelihood of trade diversion (Prusa 1997, 2001; Konings, Vandenbussche and Springael 
2001; Bown 2004) with the discriminatory application of these trade remedies indicates that even some of the 
imports destroyed by the imposition of new trade barriers (from the named sources, what we have used to 
construct table 4) will result in increased imports of the same product from non-named foreign sources.  15 
 
According to the top row of data in table 4, 1.6 per cent of China’s total 2007 exports to these 
eleven other economies were in 6-digit HS products that would become subject to their newly initiated 
trade remedy investigations sometime after the beginning of 2008. Not surprisingly, there is substantial 
variation in this statistic across the eleven economies. The highest is India, which has subsequently 
initiated investigations under one of its trade remedy laws (during 2008 through 1Q 2009) covering 
more than 7.6 per cent of its 2007 imports from China. Other countries that have investigated a 
relatively large share of their total 2007 imports from China during this same subsequent economic 
crisis period include Argentina (3.2 per cent), Brazil (2.5 per cent), Canada (2.2 per cent) and the U.S. 
(2.0 per cent). 
Finally, while these are not broken out in table 4 specifically, it is worth noting that some of major 
economies do have two or three large trade value cases that may be the ones that largely determine just 
how much trade will be affected by the use of trade remedies during the crisis. Particular examples for 
the U.S. include the China safeguard (CSG) case initiated in April 2009 over “Tires,” which has the 
potential to impact $1.9 billion of imports from China (2007 values). The EC has more than half of its 
$8 billion in imports under investigation being tied up in only three different product-level 
investigations. The EC has $2.7 billion in imports from the U.S. associated with two cases initiated in 
2008 – the “Biodiesel” case for $1.7 billion and “Prepared binders for foundry molds or cores” for 
$970 million. (Coincidentally, with respect to this last case, the U.S. has a simultaneous investigation 
over the same 6-digit HS product imported from China.) The third major EC case is its investigation 
involving “Flat-rolled products of stainless steel” from China, Korea and Taiwan, as it had 6-digit HS 
imports totaling $1.8 billion in 2007. Finally for China’s use of trade remedies, more than half ($3.7 
billion) of the $6.2 billion in potentially affected imports stems from a 2009 case covering 6-digit HS 
imports from Korea and Thailand of “Terephthalic acid.”
13 
 
3  Questions raised by the early data on use during the crisis 
Even if the overall level of imports affected by the increasing use of these trade remedies during the 
crisis is not currently large, economists have a long established line of research identifying many 
channels through which the use of these policy instruments can generate unintended consequences with 
costly implications for economic welfare. In this section we use this economic research to guide our 
investigation of underlying cases that constitute potentially worrisome examples of resort to trade 
remedies during the crisis.  
                                                           
13 Again, the estimate of the size of trade at stake in these cases may be over-estimated given that our data derives 





3.1  Crisis protectionism leading to escalading protectionism?: Tit-for-tar retaliation, trade 
deflection, and cascading protectionism 
 
In this section we explore three channels through which current resort to trade remedy protectionism 
during the global crisis creates incentives for follow-on use by others of trade remedies and the 
possibly worrisome escalation of protectionism. To begin this exercise, we examine the use of trade 
remedies across countries over “common products” listed in Appendix table 1. The table presents 35 
instances in which more than one policy imposing country initiated a trade remedy investigation over 
the same 6-digit HS product(s) during the period covered by 1Q 2007 through 1Q2009.  These 35 
product examples cover more than 70 unique 6-digit HS codes. The table presents the name of the 
product, the 6-digit HS product(s) common to the investigating countries, the names of the countries 
undertaking the common investigations, as well as the name of targeted exporters associated with each 
investigation. The product list is organized numerically by the underlying HS codes. 
The first channel is that firms may use a policy like antidumping to discipline foreign rivals in 
direct tit-for-tar retaliatory actions. While it is relatively rare for two economies to target one another 
with simultaneous investigations over essentially varieties of the same product, one possible example 
of direct AD retaliation within varieties of the same product involves the recent U.S.-EC interaction 
over sodium products (case 1 on table 5). In October 2007, the U.S. firm E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co. was a domestic petitioner requesting initiation of a U.S. AD investigation over  “Sodium metal” 
from France, accusing the French firm Métaux Spéciaux (MSSA SAS) of dumping into the U.S. 
market. In May 2008, the U.S. imposed a preliminary AD duty of 62.62 per cent. In July 2008, the EC 
initiated AD and CVD investigations over “Sodium metal” from the U.S. in the same 6-digit HS 
product category. In December 2008, in the U.S. investigation, the USITC ruled negative on injury 
determination, and thus no final measures were imposed. As the spring of 2009, the EC investigation 
was still ongoing. 
Of course it is also not necessary for retaliation (i.e., the current trade remedy provoking use of 
future protectionism) to be limited to only instances in which countries import and export the same 
product. One country’s excessive reliance on the use of trade remedies can lead to its exporters 
becoming foreign targets in other products in the same industry, or in other industries altogether, thus 
expanding the potential escalation of protectionism.
14 This is of particular concern given the current 
economic crisis and the desire to avoid repeating the spiral of protectionism associated with the 1930s 
and the Great Depression era. 
                                                           
14 Studies of the retaliatory links and incentives created under antidumping include Blonigen and Bown (2003), 
Prusa and Skeath (2004), and Feinberg and Reynolds (2006). 17 
 
A second concern raised by the “Sodium metal” cases is that even if no antidumping measures 
are imposed, the two firms that would otherwise compete vigorously with each other in the U.S. and 
EC markets (resulting in lower prices for consumers) may be able to use the AD process to reach an 
implicitly collusive agreement to less vigorously compete in each other’s market (thus hurting 
consumers). We further explore possible anti-competitiveness effects to the use and abuse of trade 
remedies in section 3.2 below. 
A second channel through which current protectionism may create incentives for future, 
additional protectionism is associated with the phenomenon of “trade deflection” (Bown and Crowley 
2006, 2007; Durling and Prusa, 2006) in which follow-on countries may resort to use of these trade 
policy instruments to prevent export surges of the same product to the first country’s trade remedy 
imposition. As one potential example, consider the “Footwear” cases associated with product number 
18 on table 5. Brazil began the potential cascade of protectionism in footwear by initiating an 
antidumping investigation against China in December 2008. Fearing that the trade shut out of the 
Brazilian market may then “deflect” from that market and surge into its own market, other importing 
countries may be prompted to implement their own trade remedies on imports of the product, perhaps 
against the same exporter. In the case of footwear, Argentina followed Brazil’s AD case against China 
by initiating an AD case of its own against China in March 2009 (Canada had also initiated a footwear 
AD against China in February 2009). The existence of so many examples of product overlap in table 5, 
as well as the frequency with which common exporters are being targeted across countries, suggests 
this may be a part of the explanation for these and future acts of protectionism in the data.
15 
A third channel of current use of trade remedies creating additional incentives for future use is 
sometimes referred to as “cascading protectionism” (Hoekman and Leidy, 1992). Another concern 
raised by the table 5 list of products is the number of measures likely to affect intermediate inputs. 
Imposing new trade barriers on inputs can adversely affect downstream producers by increasing their 
costs, thus decreasing their competitiveness in the global marketplace with other foreign suppliers that 
do not face such additional costs.
16 One important example from table 5 is found in products 12 through 
16, which are various forms of yarns and fibres that are crucial inputs into the production of textiles and 
apparel, an important source of industrial output and exports for many developing countries. 
Interestingly, the countries that are imposing these new restrictions on yarn and fibres are Turkey, Peru, 
                                                           
15 There are other possible explanations for this aside from trade deflection which merit investigation as well, 
such as that Brazil identifying Chinese footwear producers of dumping informed domestic firms in Argentina 
(and Canada) and triggered their initiatives to pursue cases as well. 
 
16 For a theory and an empirical application to the steel industry of how trade remedies can be used strategically to 
raise a rival firms’ costs, see Durling and Prusa (2003). 
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Argentina, South Africa, Brazil, and India. These developing economies are many of the same 
countries whose textile and apparel industries are already struggling to compete in global markets with 
China’s textile and apparel exports. Using trade remedies to raise the cost of an integral input is likely 
to have unintended and yet important downstream competitiveness consequences, including increasing 
the probability that these developing economies’ textile and apparel producers may themselves be the 
next in line demanding their own protectionism through trade remedies.  
 
3.2  Antidumping, multinational firms, and potential concerns of anti-competitive behavior  
There are a number of additional worries when it comes to the use of policies such as antidumping. 
Firms may abuse the policy by convincing government policymakers to impose trade barriers that, 
while in the firms’ interest, are not in the overall interest of the country. There are a number of 
mechanisms through which firms may manipulate such policies – including by using it as a tool to get 
government policymakers to assist (perhaps unwittingly) firms to segment markets (raising anti-
competitiveness concerns), and as a tool to raise domestic rivals costs. The potential for abuse is 
increasingly heightened when the key industrial users of the policies are multinational firms with 
headquarters and subsidiaries situated globally that have the ability to tap into (and to be affected by) 
trade remedies in many different political jurisdictions.
17  
First, the desire to segment markets identified in the U.S.-EC “Sodium metal” cases described 
in section 3.1 is not limited to rival firms, but it may also take place between subsidiaries of the same 
firm. A careful examination of the repetitiveness of firm names in trade remedy initiations (compiled 
into the publicly available Global Antidumping Database) allows us to identify two potential examples 
worthy of further investigation. 
One example is an instance in November 2008 in which the U.S. imposed definitive AD duties 
on “Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) film, sheet, and strip” from China, including 3.49 per cent on 
DuPont Teijin Films China Ltd. According to its website, DuPont Teijin Films is a 50-50 global joint 
venture between the American firm DuPont and the Japanese firm Teijin.
18 According to the public 
records in the case, the American subsidiary DuPont Teijin Films is one of the domestic petitioners 
behind the U.S. effort to target the Chinese subsidiary of the same firm with new import restrictions 
that could have the effect of segmenting markets. 
A second example took place when India imposed a definitive AD measure on “Compact 
fluorescent lamps” from China in February 2009. The measure was an agreement that Chinese firms, 
                                                           
17 Important contributions to the economic research literature on the ways in which access to antidumping can 
inadvertently increase the concern for anti-competitive behavior include Prusa (1992), Messerlin (1992), and 
Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999). 
18 See http://www.dupontteijinfilms.com . 19 
 
would voluntarily agree to raise prices and for a given downward-sloping import demand curve, by 
extension, reduce export volumes. One of the Chinese firms agreeing to the new price undertaking was  
Osram China Lighting Co. Ltd., a subsidiary of Osram, which is a German-headquartered firm. This is 
particularly interesting given that one of the domestic petitioning firms was Osram India Pvt. Ltd., the 
Indian subsidiary of the same German-headquartered parent Osram.
19 Thus this is an example of one 
subsidiary targeting another subsidiary with a new trade restriction that could also have the anti-
competitive effect of segmenting markets. 
As a second channel through which multinational firms and foreign direct investment may have 
distorting effects on the use of trade remedies, consider a situation in which the imposition of import 
protection in the past created incentives for firms to expand the reach of their multinational operations 
and “tariff jump” to avoid trade barriers by creating local producers that would not be subject to future 
import restrictions.
20 Once a multinational firm has the local presence, it may become part of the 
domestic industry petitioning to use trade remedy instruments to increase the likelihood of import 
restrictions against other foreign sources (that have not established a local presence), thus affecting the 
discriminatory application of the trade remedy use. Blonigen and Ohno (1998), for example, provide a 
model in which foreign firms that locate production in the home country then use increased exports to 
increase protectionist pressures within the home country to trigger new and larger barriers against other 
foreign competitors in future periods. 
The recent wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the global steel industry in particular 
create a number of potential instances in which this sort of behavior by firms is now possible. Consider 
the activities of Indian steel firms such as Mittal, which acquired the European steel producer Arcelor 
(to become ArcelorMittal) in 2006, and Tata, which merged with the UK steel firm Corus in 2007, and 
how this may affect the current application of trade remedy use in both the EC and in India during the 
global economic crisis. 
In the case of the EC, consider three examples of recent AD petitions for new trade remedies 
over steel products that have involved ArcelorMittal and/or Corus/Tata being part of the domestic EC 
industry petitioners bringing forward a case. In December 2008, the EC imposed definitive AD duties 
on “Certain welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel” from Belarus, China and Russia. In 
February 2009, the EC imposed preliminary AD duties on “Wire rod” from China, Moldova, and 
Turkey. In April 2009, the EC imposed preliminary AD duties on  “Certain seamless pipes and tubes” 
from China. In none of these cases did the trade remedies target imports from India, despite Indian 
exporters being a major competitive producer of steel globally.   
                                                           
19 See http://www.osram.com/osram_com/About_Us/The_Company/index.html . 20 
 
With respect to India’s own use of new import restrictions over steel during the crisis, the 
global M&A activity by Indian steel firms also has the potential to shape which foreign targets are 
affected by its potentially discriminatory application of antidumping. As a potential example, in March 
2009 India imposed preliminary AD duties on “Cold-rolled flat products of stainless steel” from the EC 
and 7 other exporting countries. The Indian domestic petitioner behind this particular case was Jindal 
Stainless Limited, and not domestic firms like Tata or Ispat from the Mittal Group.
21 On the other hand, 
when the Indian domestic petitioners including Ispat (Mittal Group) filed a December 2008 AD 
investigation over “Hot rolled steel products” from 15 exporting countries, the only EC member state 
named in the investigation was the most recently added member, Romania. 
While these examples are surely not conclusive evidence of anti-competitive behavior, given the 
scope for abuse of antidumping and other trade remedy provisions, these and other AD investigations 
should be closely monitored. One serious concern is that firms will use the cover of the global 
economic crisis to stoke protectionist sentiment and these trade remedies will inadvertently be applied 
by government policymakers in a way that reduces competitiveness conditions. This has the potential 
for far-reaching and longer-lasting effects than the costs imposed on consumers and consuming 
industries associate with the “mere” imposition of trade restrictions. 
 
4  Policy Implications and Conclusions 
The global economic crisis has been accompanied by an increase in the global use of import-restricting 
trade remedies as a protectionist response. While the data suggests that there has been an increase, the 
scale of the use of these particular policy instruments has been limited. The most intensive use has been 
in developing countries, and the biggest and most worrisome user being India. The export targets of the 
new protectionism are increasingly concentrated in other developing countries, and the intensity of use 
against China’s exporters is also of concern for the longevity and sustainability of the trading system. 
While the scale of the problem associated with the use of trade remedies during the crisis thus 
far is not massive, there are a number of worrisome in trends in how it is being use to suggest that 
future use may also increase, due to retaliation, the response to trade deflection concerns, and cascading 
protectionism to downstream industries. The use of antidumping during the crisis in sectors with 
substantial recent M&A activity also stokes concerns of potential abuse and anti-competiveness 
concerns that firms may be using these policies in their attempts to segment markets. 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
20 Even antidumping itself may create incentives for firms to engage in FDI in order to avoid future application of 
such trade restrictions. For evidence, see Belderbos (1997) and Blonigen (2001). 
21 However, Jindal Stainless Limited does report on its website subsidiaries in the UK (Jindal Stainless UK 
Limited, London) and Italy (Jindal Stainless Italy S.r.l. ), see http://www.jindalstainless.com/subsidiary-
companies.html , last accessed on 10 June. 21 
 
The first lesson for policymakers stemming from this data and from decades of economic 
research into the effects of these policies is to hold the line. To the greatest extent possible, 
policymakers should refuse new requests to implement such acts of import protection through trade 
remedies.  
However, if it is not possible to dismiss all the requests for protection, economists have a duty 
to advise policymakers on how to impose any new trade barriers in a means that are least distortive and 
costly (in terms of economic efficiency) lasting for as short a period as possible. If policymakers must 
resort to use of trade remedies amidst political pressure during the economic crisis, there a number of 
reasons to strongly encourage the protectionism be fitted into using the global safeguards (SG) 
instrument and not the other country-specific instruments like AD, CVD or the CSG. 
First, the WTO rules require SG protection must be applied on a nondiscriminatory (MFN) 
basis, which is more likely to prevent potentially costly trade diversion than trade remedies imposed in 
the form of AD, CVD or CSG. The imposition of an import restriction on, say, China alone may 
impose other efficiency costs if it just creates incentives for domestic consumers to switch their 
sourcing to other higher cost foreign suppliers that are not subject to the trade restriction. While a SG 
does still raise the price facing consumers and thus impose a cost on the economy, an efficiency 
“benefit” to the policy is that it does not sever the link between any remaining imports and the identity 
of the most efficient foreign source of those imports.  
Second, the WTO’s SG provisions have a built-in time process for scaling back and ultimately 
eliminating the protection over time. This is important during the global crisis as the speed with which 
countries are able to extricate themselves from their economic downturns is likely affected by their  
impediments to growth, which would include the imposition of new trade barriers taken on during the 
crisis. Historically, SG-imposing countries have been much more likely to remove the protectionism 
than has been the case for AD or CVD. And as table 65 indicates, it is unlike that adversely affected 
exporters will be able to resort to the WTO’s dispute settlement provisions anytime soon to deal with 
the problem of getting potentially WTO-inconsistent AD or CVD measures removed. The table shows 
that the developing country exporters that are the main target of the current use of these trade remedies 
during the crisis have challenged less than 5 per cent (38 out of 909) of the imposed measures through 
formal WTO dispute settlement. Thus it is better that such policies not be imposed in the first place, but 
that a global safeguard with a built-in phase-out mechanism, be used instead. 22 
 
Table 5. WTO Member Antidumping and Countervailing Measures Initiations, Impositions and DSU 
Challenges, by Targeted WTO Exporter for 1995-2008 
 

















           
Total developed economy exporters  1175 722  72  72  39  15 
            
EC 283  161  55  33  22  9 
Japan  144  106 2  0 0  0 
U.S.  189  115 5  7 1  0 
Korea 252  150  3  16  9  3 
Taiwan* 92  64  2  1  0  0 
Other developed  215  126  5  15  7  3 
            
            
Total developing economy exporters  1416 909  38  125  82  9 
            
Argentina 30  15  3  6  4  0 
Brazil 97  74  5  7  8  1 
 China*  410  295  5  23  14  5 
Costa Rica  2  0  1  0  0  0 
Guatemala 3  1  1  0  0  0 
India 137  84  10  46  27  2 
Indonesia 145  82  2  11  8  0 
Malaysia 90  50  0  3  3  0 
Mexico 40  27  5  0  0  0 
Pakistan 10  6  0  1  1  0 
Philippines 11  6  0  1  2  0 
South Africa  58  38  0  6  4  0 
Thailand 142  84  2  9  3  0 
Turkey 44  25  2  2  1  0 
 Other developing  197  122  2  10  7  1 
            
            
Total WTO member exporters  2591 1631  110  197  121  24 
            
 
Source: Table 4-3 of Bown (forthcoming, b). *Since WTO accession in 2001. 
 
The third and fourth reasons to prefer SG are more subtle but nevertheless still important. 
Because global safeguards are “fair trade” provisions, they are less adversarial to foreigners. Unlike 
AD or CVD, using SG does not require an allegation of foreign wrongdoing (dumping or illegal 
subsidies). Instead, SG entails greater recognition and acceptance that the act of protectionism is a 
response to a crisis. Using SG over AD/CVD may thus decrease the likelihood of foreign retaliation 
and the ramping-up of protectionist sentiment in trading partners. As a final technical matter, SG is 
simply less costly for a bureaucracy to administer than policies such as AD and CVD, which are much 
more data intensive. Taking as given that the end of an investigation is simply going to result in 23 
 
protectionism, it seems wasteful for developing countries in particular to use scarce governmental 
resources administering the more complex form of what are similarly protectionist policies.  
  
References 
Belderbos, René (1997) “Antidumping and Tariff Jumping: Japanese Firms’ DFI in the European 
Union and the United States,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 133(3): 419-457.  
Blonigen, Bruce A. (2002) “Tariff-Jumping Antidumping Duties,” Journal of International Economics 
57: 31-50.  
Blonigen,, Bruce A. and Chad P. Bown (2003)  “Antidumping and Retaliation Threats,” Journal of 
International Economics  60(2): 249-273. 
Blonigen, Bruce A., and Yuka Ohno (1998) “Endogenous Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and 
Protection-Building Trade,” Journal of International Economics 46: 205-227.  
Blonigen, Bruce A. and Thomas J. Prusa (2003)  “Antidumping,” in E. Kwan Choi and James Harrigan 
(eds.) Handbook of International Trade  Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers. 
Bown, Chad P. (forthcoming, a) “China’s WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute 
Settlement,” in Robert Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei (eds.) China’s Growing Role in World 
Trade. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press for NBER. 
Bown, Chad P. (forthcoming, b) Self-Enforcing Trade: Developing Countries and WTO Dispute 
Settlement. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Bown, Chad P. (2009a) “Protectionism Is on the Rise: Antidumping Investigations,” in Richard 
Baldwin and Simon Evenett (eds.) The Collapse of Global Trade, Murky Protectionism, and 
the Crisis: Recommendations for the G20. VoxEU.org e-book, 5 March. 
Bown, Chad P. (2009b) “U.S.-China Trade Conflicts and the Future of the WTO,” Fletcher Forum of 
World Affairs 33(1): 27-48. 
Bown, Chad P. (2005) “Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why Are 
So Few Challenged?” Journal of Legal Studies  34(2): 515-555. 
Bown, Chad P. (2004) “How Different Are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from U.S. Trade 
Policies toward Steel,” Brandeis University manuscript. 
Bown, Chad P. and Meredith A. Crowley (2007) “Trade Deflection and Trade Depression,” Journal of 
International Economics 72(1): 176-201.  
Bown, Chad  P. and Meredith A. Crowley (2006) “Policy Externalities: How U.S. Antidumping Affects 
Japanese Exports to the E.U.,” European Journal of Political Economy 22(3): 696-714.  
Bown, Chad P. and Meredith A. Crowley (2005) “Safeguards,”  in Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E. 
Appleton, and Michael G. Plummer (eds.)  The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic 
and Political Analysis.  New York: Springer. 
Bown, Chad P. and Rachel McCulloch (2003) “Nondiscrimination and the WTO Agreement on 
Safeguards,” World Trade Review 2(3): 327-348. 
Durling, James P. and Prusa, Thomas J. (2006) “The Trade Effects Associated with an Antidumping 
Epidemic: The Hot-Rolled Steel Market, 1996-2001,”European Journal of Political Economy 
22(3): 675-95.  
Durling, James P. and Thomas J. Prusa (2003)  “Using Safeguard Protection to Raise Domestic Rivals' 
Costs,” Japan and the World Economy 15(1): 47-68. 
Feinberg, Robert M. and Kara M. Reynolds (2006) “The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role 
of Retaliation in Filings.” Southern Economic Journal, 72(4): 877-890.   
Hoekman, Bernard M. and Michael P. Leidy (1992) “Cascading Contingent Protection,” European 
Economic Review 36(4): 883-892. 
Irwin, Douglas A. (2005) “The Rise of U.S. Antidumping Activity in Historical Perspective,” The 
World Economy 28: 651-668. 24 
 
Knetter, Michael M. and Thomas J. Prusa (2003) “Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: 
Evidence from Four Countries,” Journal of International Economics, 61(1): 1-17. 
Konings, Jozef, Hylke Vandenbussche and Linda Springael (2001) “Import Diversion under European 
Antidumping Policy,” Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 1(3): 283-299 
Messerlin, Patrick A. (1992) “Antidumping Regulations or Pro-Cartel Laws? The EC Chemical Cases,” 
The World Economy 13: 465-492. 
Prusa, Thomas J. (2001) “On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping,” Canadian Journal of Economics 
34(3): 591-611. 
Prusa, Thomas J. (1997) “The Trade Effects of U.S. Antidumping Actions,” in Robert Feenstra (ed.) 
The Effects of U.S. Trade Protection and Promotion Policies. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press for NBER. 
Prusa, Thomas J. (1992) “Why Are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn?” Journal of 
International Economics 33(1/2): 1-20. 
Prusa, Thomas J. and Susan Skeath (2004) “Modern Commercial Policy: Managed Trade or 
Retaliation?” in E. Kwan Choi and James Hartigan (eds.), Handbook of International Trade 
(Vol. II). Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishing. 
Staiger, Robert W. and Frank A. Wolak (1994). “Measuring Industry-Specific Protection: Antidumping 
in the United States,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 51-118. 
Veugelers, Reinhilde and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) “European Anti-Dumping Policy and the 
Profitability of National and International Collusion,” European Economic Review 43: 1-28. 
 25 
 
Appendix Figure A.  WTO Membership Use of Antidumping (AD), 1995 - 1Q 2009  
 



















































Sources: data in panel a taken from the WTO member reports to the Committee on Antidumping and 
comprehensively covers the full WTO membership. Data in panel b compiled by the author from the Global 
Antidumping Database and covers only 20 using countries. According to data from the WTO, these 20 Members 
initiated 90 per cent (89 per cent) of all antidumping investigations (new measures imposed) by the WTO 
membership during 1995-2007. Unlike figure 1, the unit of observation is a WTO member country’s AD action 

















Appendix Figure B.   WTO Membership Use of Countervailing Duties (CVD), 1995 - 1Q 2009 
 

















































Sources: data in top panel taken from the WTO member reports to the Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures and comprehensively covers the full WTO membership. Data in bottom panel 
compiled by the author from the Global Antidumping Database and covers only 18 using countries. 
According to data from the WTO, these 18 Members initiated 93 per cent (97 per cent) of all countervailing 
duty investigations (new measures imposed) by the WTO membership during 1995-2007. Unlike figure 1, 
the unit of observation is a WTO member country’s CVD action over a given product from a single exporting 
country. 27 
 
Appendix Figure C. WTO Membership Use of Global Safeguards (SG), 1995-1Q 2009 
 
















































Sources: data in both panels taken from the WTO member reports to the Committee on Safeguards and 
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Sources: data taken from WTO member reports to the Committee on Safeguards and comprehensively covers the 
full WTO membership to the extent that members report all initiated investigations. Also supplemented with 




Appendix Table 1. Examples of Product Overlap of Trade Remedy Investigations Across Countries, 1Q 2007 - 1Q 2009 
  
Product  Common HS  
Code (6-digit) 






(initiated case in which named) 
          
1  Sodium  280511  1. U.S.  2. EC  EC (1); U.S. (2) 
2  Nitrites  283410  1. U.S.  2. India (CVD)  China (1,2); EC (1) 
3  Citric acid  291814  1. South Africa  2. EC 
3. U.S. 
China (1,2,3); Canada (3) 
  Citric acid  291815  1. EC  2. U.S.  China (1,2); Canada (2) 
4  Matches  360500  1. U.S.  2. Ukraine (SG)  India (1) 
5  Prepared binders for foundry 
molds or cores 
382490  1. U.S.  2. EC  China (1); U.S. (2) 
6 Polyethylene  terephthalate 
(PET) film 
392062 1.  Brazil  2.  U.S. 
3. Turkey (CVD) 
India (1,3); Thailand (1,2); Brazil (2); China (2); UAE (2) 
7  Polyesters  392069  1. Brazil  2. Turkey (CVD)  India (1,2); Thailand (1) 
8  Motor car tires  401110  1. Brazil  2. U.S. (CSG)  China (1,2) 
9  Bus and truck tires  401120  1. U.S.  2. Brazil 
3. India 
China (1,2,3); Thailand (3) 
10  Laminated flooring  441113, 441114, 
441192, 441193 
1. Turkey  2. India 
3. Argentina 
China (1,2,3); EC (3); Malaysia (2); New Zealand (2); Sri Lanka 
(2); Switzerland (3); Thailand (2) 
11  Bound stationery  482010  1. New Zealand  2. U.S.  China (2); EC (2); Korea (2); Malaysia (1) 
12  Cotton yarn  5205, 5206  1. Turkey (SG)  2. Peru (SG)  All because SG 
13  Polyester yarn  540233  1. Turkey  2. Argentina  China (1,2); Indonesia (1,2); India (2); Malaysia (1); Taiwan (2); 
Thailand (1) 
14  Polyester fibre  550320  1. Pakistan  2. Argentina 
3. South Africa 
China (1,2,3); India (2); Indonesia (2); Taiwan (2) 
15  Artificial staple fibers of rayon  550410  1. Brazil  2. India  China (1,2); Indonesia (1,2); EC (1); Taiwan (1); Thailand (1) 
16  Certain yarn  550931, 550932  1. Turkey  2. Argentina  Indonesia (1,2); Brazil (2); China (1); India (1) 
  Certain yarn  551011  1. Turkey  2. Brazil  China (1,2); Indonesia (1,2); India (1,2); EC (2); Taiwan (2); 
Thailand (2) 
17  Blankets and traveling rugs  630140  1. Brazil  2. Egypt (SG)  China (1) 




1. Brazil  2. Canada 
3. Argentina 
China (1,2,3); Vietnam (2) 








 Footwear  640110,  640192, 
640199 
1. Canada  2. Argentina  China (1,2); Vietnam (1) 
19  Ceramic tiles (unglazed)  690790  1. Ecuador (CSG)  2. Jordan (SG)  China (1) 
  Ceramic tiles (glazed)  690890  1. Ecuador (CSG)  2. India 
3. Morocco (SG)  
4. Jordan (SG) 
China (1,2) 
20  Tableware and kitchenware  691110, 691200  1. Ecuador (CSG)  2. Argentina  China (1,2) 
21  Wire of iron or nonalloy steel  721710  1. EC  2. Indonesia (SG)  China (1) 





1. EC  2. India  China (1,2); Korea (1,2); Taiwan (1,2); Japan (2); EC (2); South 
Africa (2); Thailand (2); U.S. (2) 
23  Pipes and tubes  730429  1. Canada  2. Ukraine (SG) 
3. EC 
China (1,3) 
  Pipes and tubes  730630  1. U.S.  2. EC 
3. Canada 
4. Australia 
China (1,2,3,4); Belarus (2); Bosnia Herzegovina (2); Malaysia 
(4); Russia (2) 
  Pipes and tubes  730661  1. U.S.  2. EC 
3. Australia 
China (1,3); Turkey (1,2); Belarus (2); Korea (1); Malaysia (3); 
Mexico (1); Ukraine (2) 
24  Iron or steel chain  731582  1. South Africa  2. Argentina  China (1,2) 
25  Iron or steel nails, tacks, pins, 
corrugated nails, staples 
731700  1. U.S.  2. Indonesia (SG)  China (1); UAE (1) 
26  Screws and bolts  731815  1. EC  2. U.S.  China (1,2) 




1. South Africa  2. Canada  China (1,2) 
28  Aluminum foil  760711  1. EC  2. India (CSG)  China (1,2); Armenia (1); Brazil (1)  
29  Heat pumps  841861  1. Argentina  2. Canada  China (2); Malaysia (1); Thailand (1) 
30  Refrigerators  841899  1. Canada  2. U.S.  China (1,2) 
31  Food grinders, processors and 
mixers 
850940  1. Turkey (SG)  2. Argentina  China (2); Brazil (2) 
32  Recordable DVDs and CDs  852340  1. India  2. Brazil (SG) 
3. Argentina 
China (1); Hong Kong (1); Paraguay (3); Taiwan (1) 
33  Articles of graphite  854511  1. U.S.  2. Brazil  China (1,2) 
34  Road wheels and parts and 
accessories thereof 
870870  1. Australia  2. Argentina  China (1,2) 
35  Parts and accessories of motor 
vehicles 
870899  1. Argentina  2. India  China (1,2) 
Source: Compiled by the author from the Global Antidumping Database. The table identifies more than 70 distinct 6-digit HS codes with at least two different 
countries newly initiating trade remedy investigations over the same code between 1Q 2007 and 1Q 2009.